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Ia the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
DWIGHT L. KING, Administrator of
the Estate of GERALD DALLAS
THOMAS, deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Case No.
7221

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The r~spondent's brief concedes the accuracy of the
statement of facts set forth in the appellant's brief, but
states certain "additions." It will be noted that most of the
additions apply to the issue raised by paragraph VIII (a)
of the complaint, relating to the particular method used in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
placing cars on the bin at the time of the accident and
death of the deceased. The evidence with respect to this
issue was disputed, and the appellant does not claim any
error on the part of the trial court in submitting this issue
to the jury. For this reason, some of the evidence with
respect to this issue was not detailed in appellant's original
brief, and it is unnecessarily set forth in respondent's brief.
The several arguments and contentions of the appellant are set forth in its original brief under topic headings
numbered I to VII inclusive. The same topical order and
numbering is followed in the present reply brief, and the
counter-arguments of the respondent are discussed under
the appropriate heading of the appellant's numbering rather
than respondent's, since the respondent's numbering varies
from that of appellant's.
I.
Appellant's original brief under Point I, consists of
the contention that there is no evidence of any violation by
the defendant of the Safety Appliance Act, and that the
trial court erred in submitting this issue to the jury. In
this connection, it was pointed out that under the doctrine
of Myers v. Reading Company, 331 U. S. 477, 67 S. Ct. 1334,
there could be no jury issue without substantial evidence
tending to prove that Thomas operated the brake on the car
he was riding, with due care, in the normal, ~atural and
usual manner and that the brake failed to function when
so operated. It further was argued that so far as the
record in this case, there was no evidence of any application
of the brake by Thomas, until after the cars were ·less than
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fifty feet from the end of the bin and Thomas had passed
the "danger" sign. Under no circumstances indicated by
the evidence could the cars have been stopped or prevented
from going over the end of the bin by operation of the hand
brake at this point.
Respondent does not dispute either the above statement of the law as set forth in the Myers case, or the fact
that there was no evidence of any application of the brake
by Thomas until too late to stop the cars from passing over
the end of the bin. Respondent does claim however that
there was an "evidentiary basis" for a finding that the brake
was defective on the car Thomas was riding. According to
respondent this consisted of the following: (1) Thomas at
all times appeared to be in the performance of his duties,
(2) that there was some application of the brake in slowing
the cars, (3) that the vigorous application of the brake
while the cars were going four miles per hour made no
noticeable difference in their speed.
An examination of the record fails to reveal any basis
for any such conclusions. To support the statement that
Thomas at all times appeared to be in performance of his
duties, respondent directs attention to the testimony that
Thomas was standing in the "prescribed" place on the brake
platform of the car on which he was riding and therefore
was in proper postion to have used the brake. From this
single fact and nothing more, respondent then leaps to the
broad claim that "Thomas at all times appeared to be in
the performance of his duties." Certainly, appellant does
not dispute that Thomas was riding in the "prescribed''
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position on the brake platform as the cars were being taken
down the bin track. Where else could he have ridden? But
respondent omits to mention that Thomas had another all
important duty to discharge at that particular time. That
duty was to apply the brake so as to control the speed of
the cars and bring them to a stop on the bin. Did Thomas
discharge this duty? Respondent suggests no evidence tending to show compliance with this duty, and the affirmative
testimony is all to the contrary. No witness saw Thomas at
every instant during his 3,000 foot ride down the bin track,
but the witnesses Dodds and Ross did see him at several
different points. On each occasion that they did observe
him, Thomas was making no application of the brake whatsoever. Not until after the cars were less than fifty feet
from the end of the bin structure was any attempt made to
apply the brake. How then can it seriously be claimed that
the evidence supports the assertion that at all times Thomas
appeared to be in the performance of his duties?
Respondent next claims that there was testimony of
''some application of the brake in slowing the cars." To
support this, respondent points to the testimony of Conductor Barnes to the effect that the cars appeared to be
slowing as they approached the bin; that speed on the bin
track is usually attained the first five or six hundred feet
on the heavy grade of the track and that thereafter the
grade is comparatively regular all the way out to the bin.
From this testimony, respondent jumps to the inference that
Thomas was making application of the brakes as he rode
along the track. But in considering the testimony of Barnes,
it should be borne in mind that he was approximately a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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half a mile away from the moving cars when making his
observations. At no time could Barnes see Thomas on the
cars from that distance (R. 170), and Barnes' testimony
concerning the speed of the cars was based according to
his own statement on what he "imagined" or "guessed"
(R. 169, 193-194). Even more significant are the physical
facts pertaining to the grade of the 3,000 foot bin track,
as indicated by Exhibit A. For the first 300 to 350 feet, the
grade is 3.5%. Loaded cars would naturally gain considerable momentum and speed on this portion of the track.
For the next 500 feet the grade is slightly less, varying from
3.5% to 0.5)c. From that point on it slackens appreciably,
and for the remaining distance of approximately 22:00 feet
to the bin, the grade is practically level and at two different
places is slightly adverse. Naturally, cars rolling down the
bin track would gradually slow up as the grade slackened.
How can it be said that this natural slowing of the cars on
the slackening grade would indicate an application of the
brake by Thomas? Regardless of any application of the
brakes, the cars would gradually lose their momentum as
they approached the bin. In addition to these physical facts,
the evidence is clear that at every point on the bin track
where the cars were observed, no application of the brake
was made by Thomas, until after the cars had reached a
point less than fifty feet from the end of the bin. Dodds
observed the movement of the cars from point "D" on Exhibit A just as they entered the bin track until they reached
point "D-4" about 1800 feet from the bin. At no time
during this period was Thomas seen to do anything with
reference to the brakes. He was just riding along, holding
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onto the brake wheel (R. 319). Ross observed Thomas on
the cars at point "R-4" as the cars entered the trestle approach to the bin structure and again as the cars passed
the "danger" sign. At neither point was Thomas making
any application of the brakes (R. 293-295, 306). Not until
after the cars had passed the "danger" sign, did Thomas
apply the brake (R. 295, 307). In view of this evidence,
for the respondent to say that "there was some application of
the brakes in slowing the cars" is not only inconsistent with
the affirmative facts of the record, but is contrary to the
physical facts with respect to what would be the natural
behavior of the cars on the gradual slackening grade of
the bin track.
Respondent also asserts "that the vigorous application
of the brake while the cars were going four miles per hour
made no noticeable difference in their speed." But no evidence exists to support any such assertion. The one and only
application of the brake that Thomas ever was seen to make
was "after he passed" the "danger" sign (R. 295, 307),
when the cars were less than fifty feet from the end of the
bin. Just previously, Ross had observed Thomas at two
other points. First, at point "R-4" just as the cars
entered the approach to the bin, at which time the cars
were traveling at an estimated speed of twelve to fifteen
miles per hour (R. 292-293), but Thomas made no application of the brake at this point (R. 293). The cars then
momentarily passed from view. The second point at which
Ross observed Thomas was as the cars reached the "danger"
sign. At this second point the cars were moving at an
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estimated speed of eight to twelve miles per hour (R. 296),
but Thomas still was making no application of the brake
(R. 295). Thereafter, and after the cars had passed the
"danger" sign, Thomas glanced over his shoulder at the
"danger" signal and then applied the brake (R. 295). Between the point where the cars came into Ross' view as they
reached the "danger" sign and the point where Thomas first
made an application of the brake-a space of only a few
feet-the cars "seemed to stay" according to Ross, at the
relative speed of eight to twelve miles per hour (R. 296).
After the application of the brake when the cars were less
than fifty feet from the end of the bin, Thomas appeared
to step down from the brake platform to the coupling
of the car (R. 296) or to jump_ off the car (R. 307). Ross
then left the scene because of the high tension wires which
might endanger him if the cars went over the end of the
bin. He did not see the cars leave the end of the bin (R.
296).

It is obvious that the above circumstances afford no
basis for an inference that application of the brake made no
noticeable difference in the speed of the cars. No evidence
other than the foregoing is indicated by the respondent
to support his argument that there was "an evidentiary
basis" to justify submission to the jury of the issue of a
violation of the Safety Appliance Act. Respondent states
on page 21 of his brief that "there is not one scintilla of
evidence in this case that there was no application of the
brake." More properly it should be said that there is not
one scintilla of evidence in this case that there was any
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application of the brake-until concededly it was too late.
Since when does a defendant have to prove non-application
of the brake in order to be exonerated from a charge of
maintaining the brake in a defective condition?
At page 31 of its original brief, the appellant points
out the fallacy of presuming that Thomas made timely
application of the brake in the normal manner, as part of
any presumption of due care on his part. This would be
tantamount to drawing an inference of negligence on the
part of the defendant from a presumption of due care on the
part of the deceased. Looney v. Metropolitan Railroad Co.,
200 U. S. 480, 488, 2·6 8. Ct. 303, is cited as authority.
The respondent takes issue with this proposition and
quotes at length from Worthington v. Elmer, 207 Fed.
306, 308-309. No violation of the Safety Appliance Act was
charged in that case. And application of the principles of
the Myers case to a finding of a defective hand brake was
not there involved. Moreover, the negligence charged in the
Worthington case consisted of "kicking" two cars at an
excessive speed at a time when the brakes on the cars were
defective and insufficient to control their movement. There
existed undisputed evidence that the cars were moved at
an excessive speed, also that the brake mechanism on one
of the cars contained a specific defect which prevented
proper setting of the brake. On a motion by defendant for
a directed verdict, it was contended however that the defective brake was not a proximate cause of the accident
because there was no direct evidence that the deceased
was using the defective brake at the time of his injury and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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death. But the court held that there was evidence that the
deceased was standing next to the defective brake at the
time of the accident and in position to use it, that it was
part of his duty to be using it at the time of the accident,
and that these facts together with the presumption that the
deceased was performing his duties, were sufficient to
justify submitting the issue of proximate cause to the jury.
Clearly, the case falls far short of holding that a charge
of maintaining a defective handbrake in violation of the
Safety Appliance Act may be proved against a defendant
by inferring it from the mere presumption of due care in
the performance of duty on the part of the deceased. In
fact, the case is not remotely connected with any such a
proposition. The same is true of the other two cases cited
by respondent, namely, Atlantic Coast LineR. Co. v. Wetherington, 16 So. (2d) 720 and Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin
Union R. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409. In both of these
cases, the court stated the familiar proposition that in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, it might be presumed
that the deceased was engaged in the performance of his
duty and exercising due care for his own safety at the
time of his death. But to the knowledge of appellant, no
court ever has twisted this principle into a holding that
violation of a statute on the part of the defendant might
be inferred from a mere presumption of due care on the
part of the deceased.
·As a matter of fact, no presumption of due care on the
part of the deceased possibly could be indulged in the case
at bar. The affirmative evidence is all to the contrary.
Thomas had been given specific instructions by Conductor
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Barnes three or four days before as to the proper method
of controlling cars "dropped" down the bin track for spotting on the coal bin (R. 178, 191-192). Barnes had told
Thomas to reduce the speed of the cars to around seven or
eight miles per hour when he reached the curve marked
"B-1" on Exhibit A, located about 1100 feet from the bin,
also when he approached the bin to have the brakes squeezed
down to three or four miles per hour (R. 191, 198). Instead
of following these instructions, according to Barnes' own
testimony, when Thomas reached point "T" on Exhibit A,
some 600 feet past the curve marked "B-1", the cars were
going eight to ten miles per hour (R. 176) and when Thomas
approached the bin the cars were moving five or six miles
per hour (R. 193). At both points indicated, the cars were
moving faster than the speed specified in Barnes' previous
instructions to Thomas. According to the testimony of
both Dodds and Ross, the cars were moving at a substantially faster rate at these points than the speed estimated by
Barnes. All witnesses agreed that the unusual and excessive
speed of the cars down the track attracted their attention
and made them apprehensive. Also, as heretofore pointed
out, Thomas at no time during the entire journey down
the track ever was seen to apply the brakes until after
he had passed the "danger" sign and it then was too
late to prevent the cars from going over the end of the bin.
In the face of such testimony, how can a presumption of
due care in favor of the deceased possibly be indulged?
At the very least, the negligent conduct of the deceased
would be an issue for the jury, not a presumption to be
indulged for his benefit and to convict the defendant of a
violation of the Safety Appliance Act.
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II.
Under Point II of its brief, the appellant contends that
the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the issues of:
(1) alleged absence of bumper timbers or bumper device
at the end of the bin ; ( 2) alleged hazardous construction of
the bin, and also the further issue of (3) whether either
of these alleged conditions contributed to the accident resulting in the death of the deceased.
With reference to the first issue, i. e., alleged absence
of bumper timbers or bumper device at the end of the bin,
respondent's brief fails to call attention to one single item
of evidence that would constitute a basis for this issue. The
allegation of negligence is not that the bumper device was
inadequate or insufficient, but rather that no bumper device existed (R. 5). The evidence introduced by both the
plaintiff and the defendant directly contradicts this allegation. This evidence is set forth in detail in appellant's
original brief pp. 17-19; 32-36. Respondent's brief indicates
no additional or conflicting testimony.
With reference to the second issue, i. e., alleged hazardous construction of the bin, respondent argues not that
the construction of the bin, itself, was hazardous, as alleged
in the complaint, but rather that the bumper device on the
end of the bin was not sufficiently solid or secure. But even
if it were assumed that the complaint contained such an
allegation, which it does not, it is apparent that there is no
merit to the respondent's argument. The only evidence
respondent points to consists of the observation of Barnes
from a position approximately one-half mile away, that
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when the cars hit the bumper device at the end of the bin
"it seemed that this incline broke away from under them,
and they pitched off of the bin onto the ground." From this
single shred of testimony, respondent deduces that the jury
should have been allowed to decide that the bumper device
was not raised high enough above the rails, that it was not
supported as solidly as the balance of the rails on the bin,
and that some different but unspecified type of bumper
device should have been used. It is, to say the least, doubtful under the facts disclosed in this case whether any type
of bumper device could be constructed which would have
prevented heavily loaded cars traveling at a considerable
rate of speed from crashing over the end of the bin. Unless
the speed and momentum of the cars had been substantially
checked, most any type of bumper device imaginable would
have been ineffectual.
Without repeating the evidence detailed in appellant's
original brief, suffice it to say no evidence was adduced
at the trial that in any manner suggested that the bumper
device was insecure or in any way inadequate. Certainly, the
distant observations of Barnes that it "seemed" as though
the inclined bumper device broke away under the cars
does not constitute any such evidence. As pointed out in
appellant's original brief, the uncontradicted testimony was
that the bumper device was supported by four 12" by 12"
posts, by several large stringers, and the elevation of the
rails on the bumper above the base of the track was approximately four feet (R. 135). No testimony at all was
produced at the trial that such an engineering construction
was improper or insecure or in any respect inadequate for
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the purposes intended. Under the circumstances, it was
palpable error to allow the jury to speculate and conjecture
with respect to the subject.
Whether either the alleged absence of a bumper device or
the alleged hazardous construction of the bin contributed
to the accident, is a matter about which respondent makes
no contention and suggests no evidence which would justify
the submission of this question to the jury.
III.
Appellant makes the contention in Point III of its
brief, that the trial court gave to the jury a series of repetitious, inaccurate and misleading instructions with respect
to the Safety Appliance Act, which instructions unduly
emphasized plaintiff's theory of the case and unbalanced
the entire charge to the prejudice of the defendant. Respondent's answer to this contention amounts to little more
than a general denial. As illustrative of the repetitious and
prejudicial nature of these instructions, attention is directed
to the following :
The single issue of an alleged violation of the Safety
Appliance Act was submitted to the jury by five distinct
instructions, to wit, paragraph B of Instruction No. 1, Instruction No.2, paragraph 8 of Instruction No.4, paragraph
9 of Instruction No. 4, and paragraph 2 of Instruction No.
6. In addition, by paragraph 4 of Instruction No. 4, the
pertinent provisions of the Safety Appliance Act were
quoted at length.
The principle that the contributory negligence of the
deceased would constitute no defense to a violation of the
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Safety Appliance Act by the defendant was called to the
jury's attention by five separate instructions, to wit, paragraph 5 of Instruction No. 4, paragraph 7 of Instruction
No.4, paragraph 10 of Instruction No.4, Instruction No.5,
and paragraph 2 of Instruction No. 6.
Again, the jury were told by three different instructions either that the defendant was subject to the provisions
of the Safety Appliance Act or that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefits of that Act, to wit, paragraph 6 of Instruction No. 4, paragraph 11 of Instruction No. 4, and
paragraph 1 of Instruction No. 6.
In addition to their obvious vice of undue repetition
and emphasis, several of the foregoing instructions it will
be noted contain inaccurate and misleading statements of
the law in the light of the definitions of Myers v. Reading
Co., supra. Two or three of the instructions improperly
authorize the jury to make findings of fact concerning issues with respect to which there is no evidence whatever.
IV.
Defendant sets forth in its brief that Instructions Nos.
7 and 8 are erroneous because they sanction a roving commission to the jury to seek and find the defendant guilty
of negligence without reference to the particular acts of
negligence charged in the complaint or established by the
evidence. Specifically, the complaint charged an unsafe
method of work in allowing cars to run down the bin track
on their own momentum with an insufficient brake, instead of using an engine to control them. But paragraph 2
of Instruction 7 permitted the jury to find the defendant
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liable if it "failed and neglected to adopt or prescribe
reasonable safe methods," thereby allowing the jury to
speculate and conjecture at will on what it might consider
to be proper means and methods to be adopted or prescribed
by the defendant to move and spot cars, and without reference to the pleadings or evidence in the case.
The respondent answers this by saying that in any
event the evidence disclosed only two methods of doing the
work and "the jury certainly could not be mislead by this
instruction in imagining other and different ways by which
the cars could be placed on the bin." But how is the respondent qualified to guess at the limits of a jury's imagination, particularly in a case containing serious emotional
elements such as the present one? The very fact that the
evidence disclosed only two methods of spotting cars on the
bin is all the more reason why the trial court should have
strictly confined the jury's consideration to the allegations
and the evidence. Instead, the instruction permitted the
defendant to be found liable regardless of what unfounded
means or methods might occur to the jury. The mere
statement by the trial court in Instruction No. 2 that the
burden was on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence the negligence of the defendant consisting
of "some one or more of the acts alleged in the complaint"
would not cure the error. It merely aggravated it. Because
after giving Instruction No. 2, the court then threw the door
wide open by Instruction No. 7. It is well settled that
where evidence is conflicting, the fact that the law may be
correctly stated in other instructions will not obviate the
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error committed in a bad instruction. Herring v. Chicago
& A. R. Co., 299 Ill. 214, 132 N. E. 792.
With respect to paragraph 2 of Instruction No. 8, the
respondent says that no roving commission was given to
the jury by this instruction, for the reason the jury was
not expressly advised that the plaintiff would be entitled to
recover if an employee of the defendant were negligent. In
plain language, however, the jury were informed that if
Thomas sustained his injuries by reason of the negligence
of one or more of defendant's employees, then such negligence became the negligence of the defendant. In no sense
was the negligence referred or limited to that charged in
the complaint. It was implicit in the instruction that plaintiff would be entitled to reeover if any employee of the
defendant were guilty of the general "negligence" mentioned. Such would be the natural interpretation of a jury,
who would be unlikely to make the hair-splitting distinctions of learned counsel for respondent.
Apparently conceding that the trial court did commit
prejudicial error with respect to its instructions relating
to the issues of liability in this case, respondent makes the
sweeping assertion that in any event no reversible error
was committed for the reason that the evidence establishes
the negligence of the defendant as a matter of law. But a
cursory review of the pertinent evidence will serve to demonstrate the complete lack of foundation for any such proposition. Presumably, the issue to which the respondent refers
is that set forth in paragraph VIII (a) of plaintiff's
complaint wherein it is alleged in substance: That defendant
used an unsafe method of placing cars on the coal bin,
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in that, instead of using a locomotive to control the speed
of the cars, the cars were placed in motion and Thomas was
required to station himself on the lead car and control the
speed and momentum of said cars by a hand brake wholly
insufficient for that purpose.
At the outset it should be observed that the essence of
this allegation is, again, the alleged insufficiency of the hand
brake on the car ridden by Thomas. Since the appellant
contends that the record is completely devoid of any evidence
to support a claim of an insufficient hand brake and in view
of all that heretofore has been said on this subject, it is
difficult to understand how the respondent can assert that
the record establishes the insufficiency of the hand brake
as a matter of law. So far as the allegation pertains to the
particular method used of dropping cars to the coal bin
without the use of the engine, t~e record is replete with
statements by all the witnesses that this was a normal and
customary procedure. Barnes! described it as an advantageous (R. 191) and convenient (R. 197) method. He testified
that it required no unusual amount of skill for a brakeman to
drop and spot cars on the bin (R. 188); that it was an easy
method, if the brakeman used care to control the speed of
the cars by means of the hand brake (R. 178, 198). When
the suggestion was made that the bin was short of coal in
view of the fact that the switch engine was' derailed, Barnes
did not consider that there was anything unusual about the
procedure of dropping the cars out to the bin. This was a
customary method used of taking cars to the bin (R. 182183) . Barnes himself had dropped as many as, fifteen or
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twenty loaded cars over the steep part of the bin track on
prior occasions (R. 172), although he had not spotted them
on the bin. Moreover, three or four days prior to the accident, Barnes had given Thomas. instructions concerning the
proper procedure for riding cars on the bin track and spotting them at the bin (R. 178). In these instructions, Barnes
had pointed out how and when the speed of the cars should
be reduced and controlled (R. 19·1). Schauster, the other
brakeman of the crew, and both Ross and Dodds agreed that
the method used of dropping cars to the bin was usual and
customary, and that it was done frequently (R. 252, 297,
313) In the teeth of such evidence, how could any court
possibly conclude that paragraph VIII (a) of the plaintiff's
complaint had been proved as a matter of law?
The same is true of the respondent's statement that the
decedent, Thomas, was not guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law. There was abundant evidence that
Thomas dropped the cars down the bin track at a dangerous
and excessive rate of speed and that he failed to control the
speed of the cars in accordance with the specific instructions
given to him by Barnes only several days before (R. 178,
191). Also, as heretofore mentioned, the evidence indicated
that at no time did Thomas ever attempt to apply the brakes
on the car he was riding until after he had "passed" the
danger sign and it was too late to stop the cars on the bin.
It is respectfully submitted that in view of the foregoing

facts, there could not be any possible basis for application of
the doctrine of Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P.
(2d) 649, in the manner suggested by the respondent.
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v.
In its original brief, the appellant set forth the reasons
why the trial court erred in determining as a matter of law
that both the plaintiff and the defendant were engaged in
interstate commerce at the time of the accident, and that the
plaintiff therefore was entitled to the benefits of the
remedy afforded by the Federal Employer's Liability Act.
The respondent does not dispute the validity of this contention, but sidesteps the entire issue on the ground that the
defendant failed to take exception to the trial court's Instruction No.6.
It is true that so far as disclosed by the record, defen-

dant did fail to except to Instruction No. 6. Although the
record is silent on the matter, the reason no exception was
taken was due to an oversight and misunderstanding be·tween counsel for defendent. Regardless of this, however,
it is submitted that no exception to an instruction is necessary if the error is substantial, and if it involves as does the
error in the present case, a matter which strikes at the very
jurisdiction of the court. It is beyond dispute that the plaintiff is not entitled to pursue the remedy affo.rded by the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, unless both the carriel"
and the employer were engaged in interstate commerce at
the time the injury or death occurred. 45 U. 8. C. A. Sec. 51.
Here there was a failure to make a proper determination of
this fundamental issue. Absent a correct disposition of this
issue, the plaintiff is not properly in court on his present
cause of action. Although the defendant's failure to except
to the trial court's instruction ordinarily would preclude the
defendant from urging the point on appeal, such is not the
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law if the error is manifestly one of substance, jurisdictional
in nature. State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 101, 60 P. (2d) 952,
958; State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 493, 62 P. (2d) 1110,
1116. Furthermore, the trial court made the same determination of this issue by necessary implication in paragraphs
2, 3 and 5 of Instruction No. 4, to which instructions the
defendant took separate exceptions (R. 3-58).
Respondent in his brief states that after the stipulation
in the record (R. 350) was entered into, "it was assumed
by all persons connected with the trial of the case that the
defendant had stipulated the question of interstate commerce and had agreed that plaintiff's remedy was properly
pursued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act." There
is no support in the record for any such "assumption" as
this, and no such assumption existed in fact. The record
indicates that both counsel for the plaintiff and the trial
court recognized that there still was a question for the jury
on the issue of interstate commerce, even after the stipulation. The record in this. respect is perfectly plain, and is as
follows (R. 349) :
MR. McCARTHY: May it please the court, we
rest our case.
THE COURT: Do you have any witnesses, Mr.
Black?
MR. BLACK: No. We rest our case.
THE COURT: I mean any rebuttal. There was
the matter of that stipulation you mentioned last
night.
MR. BLACK : I think that stipulation should be
dictated into the record in the presence of the jury.
THE COURT: Do I understand you are prepared to stipulate as Mr. Black indicated last night?
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MR. McCARTHY: Generally, as he indicated
last night, but only to that extent.
MR. BAGLEY: I don't think it is a matter that
the jury is concerned with.
MR. BLACK: I think it is. It is an issue before
the jury.
MR. BAGLEY: The jury doesn't pass on stipulations.
MR. BLACK: They pass on the sufficiency of
the evidence, if there is an issue on it.
THE COURT: Of course, this may be an issue.
Respondent in his brief also accuses the defendant of "a
secret intent" to so word the stipulation that it would not
be effective. Nothing could be further from the truth, as
counsel for respondent well know. Since when does a defendant at the trial of a closely contested case have to furnish the plaintiff with vital evidence on a material issue
joined by the pleadings? When a plaintiff offers a stipulation of facts with respect to an issue, it is not the duty of
the defendant to inform the plaintiff that the proposed
stipulation is or is not sufficient for the purpose for which
the plaintiff apparently intends to use it. Surely the defendant was under no duty to guide the footsteps of plaintiff's
counsel on such a question of proof, especially when the
plaintiff was represented by experienced and able counsel.
VI.
Respondent disputes the defendant's contention that
under the provisions of Section 5 of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, it is entitled to offer evidence under its claim
for set-off as set forth in the amended answer.
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Respondent argues that annuity payments to a widow
pursuant to the Railroad Retirement Act do not constitute
an "insurance, relief benefit or indemnity" within the meaning of these terms in Section 5. It is submitted, however,
that the whole statutory scheme upon which such payments
are based under the Railroad Retirement Act is one of insurance. Contributions to the insurance fund are made both
by the employer and the employee during the life of the employee. Upon the death of the employee, certain insurance
benefits derive to the employee's dependent beneficiaries in
accordance with the extent of the contributions or payments
previously made. If this does not constitute a plan of insurance benefits, it is difficult to conceive of one.
Respondent next objects that Section 5 allows a set-off
only for sums, "that may have been paid to the person entitled thereto." Defendant's pleading seeks recovery for sums
which the widow of the deceased "has received or is entitled to receive," that is, sums which already have been
paid to or received by the widow plus the present value of
such sums as the widow is entitled to receive. It is submitted
that such recovery is within the literal wording and intent
of the statute.
The Hetrick and Peeler cases referred to in respondent's
brief are distinguished and discussed in detail in appellant's
original brief.

VII.
Appellant su}?mits that the verdict of the jury is excessive and that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
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dent seeks to justify the verdict by citing isolated bits of
testimony which he interprets as support for the jury's conclusion.
Appellant submits that a careful consideration of all
the evidence fully justifies the facts and conclusions set
forth in appellant's brief. It is submitted that the size of
the verdict alone is sufficient to indicate prejudice and misunderstanding of the evidence on the part of the jury, and
an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in failing to grant the defendant's motion for a new trial, within
the rule of Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P. (2d)
123. In any event, the trial court should have ordered aremittitur of a part of the excessive verdict, and the trial
court's failure to do so, constitutes an abuse of discretion
subject to review by this Court. Stephens Ranch & Live
Stock Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 Pac. 459.
Respectfully submitted,
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL and McCARTHY,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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